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ACT OF NON-SUPPORT IN OHIO SUFFICIENT TO
EXTRADITE
In re Harris v. Sweeney, Sheriff
170 Ohio St. 151, 163 N.E.2d 762 (1959)
Appellant Harris had been arrested pursuant to an extradition warrant
from Wisconsin to Ohio charging Harris with abandonment and non-support,
a crime in Wisconsin. On review of a habeas corpus proceeding, the Ohio
Supreme Court granted extradition holding that a person in Ohio who fails
to support his child in another state where he is required to do so,1 commits
an intentional act in Ohio which results in a crime in that other state and,
consequently, is extraditable under the Ohio version of section 6 of the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, Rev. Code § 2963.062.
The Harris case is significant in at least two respects. First, it is a case
of first-impression dealing with the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.
Forty-two states have adopted this uniform act, the purpose of which was to
simplify extradition. 4 Prior to the uniform act, a person need only be de-
livered up if he was physically present in the demanding state at the time
of commission of the crime and had fled therefrom. The uniform law dis-
posed of the necessity of showing fugitive status.5
The specific issue before the court in interpreting the Criminal Extradi-
tion Act was whether Harris, by failure or omitting to provide support, had
"committed an act" within the purview of the statute. Judicial definitions
of a wilfull or intentional act include acts for the purpose of doing another
some wrong, either by commission or omission. Also considerable precedent
1 "Any person who, without just cause, deserts or wilfully neglects or refuses to
provide for the maintenance of his wife or child under eighteen (legitimate or illegiti-
mate) in destitute or necessitous circumstances shall be fined not more than $500, or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both . . ." Wisc. Stat. § 52.05 (1955).
2 "The Governor may surrender, on demand of the executive authority of any
other state, any person charged in such other state in the manner provided in Section
2963.03 of the Revised Code with committing an act in this state, or in a third state,
intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose executive authority is making the
demand, and Sections 2963.01 to 2963.27 inclusive, of the Revised Code, apply to such
cases, even though the accused was not in that state at the time of the commission of
the crime, and has not fled therefrom." Ohio Rev. Code § 2963.06; 9 Unif. L. Annot.
297 (1959).
3 Supra note 2.
4 9 Unif. L. Annot. (1959 cumulation).
5 Art. IV, § 2, l. 2 of the United States Constitution provides for extradition for
persons ". . . who shall flee from justice . . ." This was interpreted to mean that a
person need only be delivered up as a fugitive if he were physically present in the
demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime and had fled therefrom.
See 22 Am. Jur. "Extradition" § 21 (1939). Bauer, "Extradition Under [2963.06],"
24 Ohio Bar (No. 33) 520 (1951). The new uniform law was held to be constitutional
in Ex parte Morgan, 78 F. Supp. 756 (S.D. Cal. 1948); aff'd, 175 F.2d 404, cert. den.,
338 US. 827; English v. Matowitz, 148 Ohio St. 39 (1947).
6 People v. Bowie, 166 N.Y.S. 905, 907 (1917).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
from other jurisdictions dealing with the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act
has indicated that failure to support would be considered the commission of
an act for purposes of extradition under the uniform statute.
7
The court, by way of dicta, referred to the possible alternative use of
Rev. Code § 3115.04, Ohio's version of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act, to secure extradition in non-support cases.8 The uniform law
commissioners drew up this statute in a specific effort to reach a deserting
husband who had absconded beyond the reach of process of the state where
he had abandoned his family, in order to obtain support from him.9 The
acuteness of the problem and the inability of conventional criminal enforce-
ment to satisfy the need led to the adoption of some version of this act in
forty-four states.' 0 As a result, it is fair to say that the statute was intended
to be used as the most convenient vehicle for action in non-support cases."
The court, however, in discussing the Support Act, indicated that this
statute would be construed exactly like the Criminal Extradition Act, i.e.,
non-support, for purposes of extradition, would be considered as the com-
mission of an act.
It is questionable whether such a construction is necessary to permit
extradition for non-support under the Support Act. Judge Taft, in a con-
curring opinion based exclusively on the Support Act, disputed this inter-
pretation stating that neither commission of an act nor the doing of anything
at all in Ohio were requisites to extradition under the Support Act.'2
7 Ex parte Hayes, 101 Cal. App. 2d 416, 225 P.2d 272 (1950); Ex parte Dalton,
56 N.M. 407, 244 P.2d 790 (1952); Roberts v. Warden of New York City Prison, 114
N.Y.S.2d (1952); People ex rel. Faulds v. Herberick, 276 App. Div. 852, 93 N.Y.S.2d
272 (1949); People ex rel. Kaufman v. O'Brien, 197 Misc. 1019, 96 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1950);
Ex parte Bledsoe, 93 Okla. Cr. App. 302, 227 P.2d 680 (1951). Contra, United States
v. Johnson, 63 F. Supp. 615 (1945); Stobie v. Barger, 129 Colo. 222, 268 P.2d 409
(1954); Ennist v. Baden, 158 Fla. 141, 28 So. 2d 160 (1946).
8 "The Governor may demand from the Governor of any other state the surrender
of any person charged in this state with failure to provide for the support of a person
in this state and may surrender on demand by the Governor of any other state any
person charged in such other state with the failure to provide for the support of a person
in such other state. Sections 2963.01 to 2963.29, inclusive, and 107.04 of the Revised
Code apply to the demand although the person whose surrender is demanded was not
in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime and although he has
not fled therefrom. Neither the demand, the oath, nor any proceedings for extradition,
pursuant to this section, need state or show that the person demanded has fled from
justice, or that he was, at the time of the commission of the crime, in the demanding or
other state.
"Any obligor contemplated by this section, who submits to the jurisdiction of the
court of such other state and complies with the court's order for support, is relieved
of extradition for desertion or non-support during the period of such compliance."
Ohio Rev. Code § 3115.04; Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 9C Unif.
L. Annot. 23 (1959).
9 9C Unif. L. Annot. 3 et seq. (1959).
10 9C Unif. L. Annot. (1959 cumulation).
11 For a further discussion of the Support Act see 24 Cin. L. Rev. 139 (1955) ; 23
Cin. L. Rev. 75 (1954); 29 Ohio Bar (No. 33) 629 (1956).
12 170 Ohio St. at 162.
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Although both interpretations reach the same conclusion, if the extra-
dition provision of the Support Act is to have any meaning in itself, it must
be liberally construed with reference to the object to be attained, i.e., an
interstate remedy for abandoned families to enable them to get the support
due them. 13 An examination of the Support Act indicates that the extradi-
tion surrender may occur whenever a person is charged in the demanding
state with the failure to provide for the support of a person there. There is
no necessity to go further. The charge upon which extradition is sought
need only allege non-support.
If the extradition provision of the Support Act is interpreted as the
majority indicates that it will be, it will add nothing to the conventional
criminal extradition statute,14 since extradition for non-support will be
secured by identical proofs and procedures under either. In other words, if
the criminal extradition statute is going to serve the function for which the
Support Act was designed, there is no necessity for the latter.
The dictum concerning the Support Act is not only confusing and un-
necessary to the decision but also probably unnecessary to the successful
operation of extradition for non-support under the Support Act since the
thing for which extradition is sought, i.e., non-support, is a specifically
named offense. What mental or physical activity or non-activity is engaged
in by the violator is irrelevant to the fact that he has violated his statutory
obligation of support.
Richard Aughenbaugh
18 fllinois ex rel. Shannon v. Sterling, 248 Minn. 266, 80 N.W.2d 13 (1956).
14 Supra note 3.
